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COMMENTS 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICA-
TION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
AND RETALIATORY LEGISLA-
TION BY FOREIGN 
COUNTRIES 
Donald J. Curotto· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of territorial sovereignty grants each nation 
the power to exercise supreme authority over all acts performed 
in its territory, and to do so at the exclusion of other nations.1 
This principle developed in a period when interaction among na-
tions was very limited, and it has been undermined by the con-
tinuous rise in transnational activity.2 Increasing contacts be-
tween subjects of different nations inevitably involves conduct in 
more than one country, thereby making difficult the determina-
tion of which nation is justified in regulating the conduct. While 
the right of each nation to control conduct within its borders is 
still recognized, the power to do so at the exclusion of other na-
tions is much debated. 
In some instances it has been common for nations to apply 
domestic laws to acts performed beyond their borders. In gen-
eral, this extraterritorial application has been tolerated when the 
countries involved have similar laws and thereby agree that the 
• Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 162 (6th ed. 1963); G. SCHWARZENBERGER & 
E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-52 (6th ed. 1976); J. STARKE, AN INTRo-
DUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 172-73 (7th ed. 1972). 
2. See W. LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 97-99 
(1979). 
577 
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conduct should be regulated. S The same has not been true when 
extraterritorial application extends to acts' that were not illegal 
in the country of performance. This has been most evident in 
the area of international trade and commerce, where approaches 
to economic regulation, as well as substantive laws, rarely coin-
cide . .{ The extent to which a nation applies its domestic laws to 
foreign conduct has develo~ed unilaterally. Although various 
guidelines have evolved in an attempt to clarify and control the 
reach of domestic laws, universal agreement remains absent. I) 
Consequently, for certain nations, the doctrine of territorial sov-
ereignty has retained little significance. 
The erosion of the territorial sovereignty doctrine is best ex-
emplified by the extraterritorial application of the United States 
antitrust laws.6 This stems from the relatively liberal standard 
used by the United States courts to find subject matter jurisdic-
tion over conduct that occurs outside the United States.7 In the 
past, the protests of foreign nations over this threat to their ter-
ritorial sovereignty have been voiced mainly through diplomatic 
3. This has been most common in the field of criminal law. See generally Straus-
berg, Erdos v. United States: Expansion of Extraterritoriality and Revivial of Extrater-
ritoriality, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 257 (1973). 
4. For a brief review of British, Japanese, Canadian and Common Market antitrust 
laws, see W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 468-91 (2d ed. 1973). 
5. See generally Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International 
Teapot, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 16 (1974); Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial 
Antitrust Violations-Paths Through the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519 
(1971); Jones, Extraterritoriality in the U.S. Antitrust: An International "Hot Potato," 
11 INT'L LAW. 415 (1977). 
6. The relevant United States antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Wilson Tariff Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-77 
(1976). 
7. Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to regulate foreign 
commerce. It is based upon the Constitution (Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 3), and is implemented by statute. [It] is the 
threshold issue in any dispute to determine whether the anti-
trust laws have been violated by conduct involving foreign 
commerce. It is not to be confused with whether, in other re-
spects, a substantive offense has occurred. 
Kiltgaard, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, in 17TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST LAW SEM-
INAR: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 19 (Practicing Law Institute 1979) 
(citing Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 
(C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972». See 
also K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 53-74 (1976); W. FUGATE, 
supra note 4, at 29-86; E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER 
29-32 (1974). Subject matter jurisdiction is a distinct and separate requirement from 
personal jurisdiction. See KINTNER & JOELSON at 21. 
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channels. s The inability to discourage the United States from 
use of the broad reach of its antitrust laws contributed to the 
recent enactment of retaliatory legislation by some foreign coun-
tries. This Comment will review the United States approach to 
subject matter jurisdiction determinations in foreign antitrust 
suits, articulate the provisions of the retaliatory legislation, and 
finally, evaluate the impact of such legislation on United States 
antitrust enforcement. 
II. THE STATUS OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
A. BACKGROUND 
The most common limitation on subject matter jurisdiction 
has been the territorial principle9-a concept that limits a na-
tion's jurisdictional reach to conduct that occurs within its terri-
tory.10 This simple definition has not been easily applied be-
cause the precise location of a particular activity has been 
subject to varied interpretations. The strict position is that ju-
risdiction can be based only on physical conduct that occurs in 
the territory (subjective territorial principle).ll The expanded 
8. See Lectures by legal scholars and government officials printed in International 
Law Association, Report of the Fifty-First Conference 384-562 (Tokyo 1964); Silkin, The 
Perspective of the Attorney General of England and Wales in AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIA-
TION, PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND 
OTHER LAWS 28-34 (J. Griffin ed. 1979). 
9. The other principles of international jurisdiction that are referred to in antitrust 
stem largely from the criminal area. The nationality principle confers jurisdiction on the 
country in which the defendant is a national. The passive nationality principle grants 
jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality of the victim. The protective principle looks 
to whether the national interest is affected. The universality principle authorizes juris-
diction to a state that has custody of the offender. See Strausberg, supra note 3, at 260-
61. In the civil area, the views have centered around the territorial and protective princi-
ples. See generally Snyder, Foreign Investment and Trade: Extraterritorial Impact of 
Unite.d States Antitrust Law, 6 VA. J. !NT'L L. 1 (1965). However, even the protective 
principle has been limited only to activities which threaten the political structure of a 
nation rather than the economic structure. See Report of the Fifty-First Conference, 
supra note 8, at 444. 
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 11-20 (1965); Report of the Fifty-First Conference, supra note 8, at 396. 
11. See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812): 
The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is nec-
essarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limita-
tion, not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving 
validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of 
its sovereignty, to the extent of the restriction, and an invest-
ment of that sovereignty, to the same extent, in that power 
3
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view confers jurisdiction when there is some form of intangible 
effect within the territory, even though the physical conduct oc-
curred outside the nation's boundaries (objective territorial prin-
ciple or effects test).IlI 
Both interpretations of the territorial principle have been 
applied in the enforcement of the United States antitrust laws. 
Initially, in American Banana v. United Fruit Company,18 the 
subjective territorial principle was adopted, resulting in the dis-
missal of the suit because the alleged antitrust violation took 
place outside the United States.I4 This strict interpretation of 
the territorial principle was not followed in subsequent cases, as 
courts struggled to find some anticompetitive conduct inside the 
United States to warrant jurisdiction over the activity. III This 
was done even though the activity in the United States was min-
imal compared to the activity abroad.I6 
which could impose such restriction. 
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 17 (1965). . 
12. See id. § 18. 
13. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
14. Plaintiff and defendant were American corporations operating separate banana 
plantations in Central America. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant attempted to mo-. 
nopolize the banana industry by buying out competitors, restraining production, fixing 
prices, and ultimately conspiring with the Costa Rican government to seize the plaintiff's 
plantations. The anti competitive acts were performed entirely outside the United States. 
Justice Holmes responded: 
But the general and almost universal rule is that the character 
of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by 
the law of the country where the act is done .••• [A statute 
is] iI\tended to be confined in its operation and effect to the 
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and le-
gitimate power. "All legislation is prima facie territorial." Ex 
parte Blain, In re Sawers, 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528; State v. 
Carter, 27 N.J. (3 Dutcher) 499; People v. Merrill, 2 Parker, 
Crim. Rep. 590, 596. 
ld. at 356-57. 
15. See Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917). A group of foreign defendants 
agreed to fix shipping rates and to restrain trade by preventing other competing shippers 
from profitable trade. The alleged antitrust violations occurred in foreign countries, but 
the shipping lines operated between the United States and South America. The court in 
distinguishing American Banana found that "the combination affected the foreign com-
merce of this country and was put into operation here." ld. at 88 (citing United States v. 
Pacific and Arctic Ry. and Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913». 
16. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). The alleged antitrust 
violation in Sisal was a conspiracy among defendants to monopolize the market for sisal, 
accomplished by the procurement of discriminatory Mexican laws: Virtually all of the 
acts occurred in Mexico. The court found jurisdiction because the combination was "en-
4
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In United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Al-
coa),17 the court opted for the objective territorial principle, and 
asserted subject matter jurisdiction over alleged antitrust viola-
tions which were performed entirely outside the United States. IS 
The sole basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign 
activity was that the defendants "intended to affect imports and 
did affect them."l9 Since the Alcoa case, the effects test has been 
the guideline for antitrust enforcement over restraints on inter-
state20 and foreign commerce,21 brought about by any type of 
anticompetitive behavior. This extraterritorial application has 
continued despite harsh criticism by,22 and uncooperative behav-
tered into by the parties within the United States," in spite of the fact that the acts were 
permitted by the local law. Id. at 276. 
17. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The objective territorial principle was subsequently 
approved by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Car-
bon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962). 
18. 148 F.2d at 443. The defendants were two French corporations, two British cor-
porations, and a Canadian subsidiary of the Aluminum Company of America. A conspir-
acy to divide world aluminum trade was alleged. Judge Learned Hand stated: "lIlt is 
settled law • . • that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its 
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders which has consequences within its borders 
.... " Id. Judge Hand required an intent to harm United States commerce and some 
effect on that commerce. 
The Alcoa rule was clarified in United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 
753 (D.N.J. 1949). There, one of the defendants, a foreign· company contended that the 
United States antitrust laws could not apply because there was no intent to restrain 
trade and no effect on U.S. foreign commerce. On the issue of intent, the J:Ourt stated 
that only a general intent to violate the antitrust laws need be found, and that an agree-
ment to refrain from its use of U.S. patents for ten years constituted a substantial effect 
on commerce. Id. at 891. 
19. 148 F.2d at 443. 
20. "When foreign transactions have aJlubstantial and foreseeable effect on U.S. 
commerce, they are subject to U.S. law regardless of where they take place." Antitrust 
Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations 6 (1977). 
See also, Westinghouse v. Rio Algom Corp., 617 F.2d 1248 (1980); United States v. 
Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aft'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); United 
States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aft'd and modi-
fied, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 
1945), aft'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947). 
21. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 
(N.D. Cal. 1957); United States v. Minnesota Mfg. & Mining Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. 
Mass. 1950). Note that Alcoa has not been precisely followed because the subsequent 
cases have involved, in part, American corporations and their subsidiaries abroad. See 1 
E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANrlTRUST LAw 299-327 (1980). 
22. See critical opinions by foreign government representatives in Report of Fifty-
First Conference, supra note 8, at 565-92. But compare the resolution adopted in 1972: 
A State has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law governing 
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect 
5
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ior of,28 foreign countries. 
Recently, in Timberlane Lumber Company v. Bank of 
America,24 the Ninth Circuit determined that the effects test 
was an inadequate standard for subject matter jurisdiction 
determinations in foreign antitrust suits. The court selected a 
balancing of interests approach based upon the principles of in-
ternational comity.215 The Timberlane court reasoned that while 
the effects test sufficiently articulates the United States interest 
in a foreign antitrust suit, the interests of other nations involved 
are not always considered. To resolve this inequity, the court set 
forth a new approach to determine subject matter jurisdiction. 
The court stated that after a showing of some effect on United 
States commerce and a violation of the antitrust laws, inter-
national comity requires an evaluation of "the interests of, 
and links to, the United States . . . vis-a-vis those of other 
within its territory if: 
(a) the conduct and the effect are constitutent ele-
ments of activity to which the rule applies, 
(b) the effect within the territory is substantial and 
(c) it occurs as a direct and primarily intended result 
of the conduct outside, the territory. 
International Law Association, Report of Fifty-Fifth Conference (New York 1973). See 
generally Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust 
Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655 (1954); Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954); Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion and the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 33 BRlT. Y.B. !Nr'L L. 146 (1957); Katzenbach, Con-
flicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and 
International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087 (1956). 
23. The process of suing a foreign corporation in an American court quite often 
forces the court to fashion a decree requiring conduct by the defendant outside the 
,United States. See United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 505 
(S.D.N.Y.), opinion on relief, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), where the court ordered 
the defending British company to transfer various 'patents obtained in England because 
of their adverse effects on U.S. antitrust laws. Compliance by the defendant would mean 
cancellation of other agreements between the defendant and another British company. 
In a subsequent suit brought in England, British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem-
ical Indus., Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 780, 783-84, the English tribunal held that Imperial 
was bound by English law to perform the contract with British Nylon irrespective of the 
U.S. court order. See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.), all'd, 344 
U.S. 280 (1952); United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 
Inc., [1963] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1170,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
24. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
25. Id. at 613-14. International comity is defined as U[t]he recognition which one 
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another 
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights 
of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 334 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
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nations .. "26 One of the comity factors that the court 
deemed important for this analysis was "the relative significance 
of effects on the United States as compared to those elsewhere 
•••• "27 Thus the effects on United States commerce was trans-
formed from the sole determinant of jurisdiction to one of a 
group of factors to be weighed in determining relative national 
interests. 
As the following three circuit court opinions demonstrate, 
the novel approach of the Timberlane court has not been pre-
cisely followed. This has caused further uncertainty among for-
eign businesses and continued foreign disapproval. As a result, 
certain foreign governments have enacted retaliatory legislation 
to combat the extraterritorial reach in American foreign anti-
trust cases. 
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corporation28 
In Mannington Mills, a violation of section 2 of the Sher-
26. 549 F.2d at 613. The alleged restraint on foreign commerce was a conspiracy 
among defendants to prohibit plaintiff from 8uccessfully operating a lumber business in 
Honduras. A portion of the finished product was exported to the United States. The 
plaintiffs were a United States partnership, and two Honduran corporations. The defen-
dants were citizens and incorporates of the United States. The restrictive act occurred on 
foreign territory. The lower court dismissed the case, in part because the effects on 
United States foreign commerce were insubstantial. Mter analyzing the nature of the 
effect needed for jurisdiction, the appellate court stated: "The effects test by itself is 
incomplete because it fails to consider other nations' interests. Nor does it expressly take 
into account the full nature of the relationship between the actors and this country." ld. 
at 611-12 (footnote omitted). The court then set forth a three-step test for examining the 
actual and intended effects on U.S. commerce, the magnitude of the impact and the 
international comity factors, including: 
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the national-
ity or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal 
places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforce-
ment by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, 
the relative significance of effects on the United States as 
compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is 
explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the 
foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the 
violations charged of conduct within the United States as 
compared with conduct abroad. 
ld. at 614; see also id. at 614 n.31 (citing REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 40 (1965». 
27. 549 F.2d at 614. 
28. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). 
7
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man Act was alleged against Congoleum through their unlawful 
procurement of foreign patents.29 Mannington and Congoleum 
were American corporations engaged in the business of manufac-
turing floor coverings. Congoleum obtained a United States pat-
ent for a chemically embossed vinyl floor covering, and Man-
nington was licensed to use the Congoleum patent in the United 
States. Congoleum also obtained similar patents in twenty-six 
foreign countries.30 Initially, Mannington unsuccessfully at-
tempted to extend its Congoleum license beyond the United 
States. An action was then filed by Mannington in the New 
Jersey District Court,31 alleging that its United States export 
trade had been restricted both by Congoleum's fraudulent repre-
sentation to foreign governments in obtaining the patents,32 and 
by its enforcement tactics when it filed or threatened to file pat-
ent infringement suits.33 
Although the alleged anticompetitive conduct occurred en-
tirely in foreign countries and was specifically approved by for-
eign governments, the court found jurisdiction over the subject 
matter because "two American litigants are contesting alleged 
antitrust activity abroad that results in harm to the export busi-
ness of one . . . ."3' Thus, the Alcoa effects test was the sole 
consideration for the finding of jurisdiction. 
After establishing jurisdiction, the court accepted the com-
ity approach of Timberlane, but provided for that consideration 
in a separate analysis,35 in which it adopted its own list of the 
relevant comity factors and remanded for further consideration 
on that basis. The relevant factors to be considered included: 
[1] Degree of conflict with foreign law or 
policy; 
[2] Nationality of the parties; 
29. ld. at 1290. 
30.ld. 
31. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., !ric., 197 U.S.P.Q. 145 (D.N.J. 
1977). 
32. 595 F.2d at 1290. 
33. ld. A finding for Mannington would effectively invalidate Congoleum's right to 
license foreign patents or to enforce foreign violations through the U.S. courts. 
34. 595 F.2d at 1292. Essentially, this was an application of the effects test. See 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). 
35. "Having concluded that . . • there is subject matter jurisdiction, the question 
remains whether jurisdiction should be exercised." 595 F.2d at 1294. 
8
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[3] Relative importance of the alleged viola-
tion of conduct here compared to that 
abroad; 
[4] Availability of a remedy abroad and the 
pendency of litigation there; 
[5] Existence of intent to harm or affect 
American commerce and its foreseeability; 
[6] Possible effect upon foreign regulations if 
the court exercises jurisdiction and grants 
relief; 
[7] If relief is granted, where a party will be 
placed in the position of being forced to per-
form an act illegal in either country or be 
under conflicting requirements by both 
countries; 
[8] Whether the court can make its order 
effective; 
[9] Whether an order for relief would be ac-
ceptable in this country if made by the for-
eign nation under similar circumstances; 
[10] Whether a treaty with the affected na-
tions has addressed the issue.36 
585 
By relying on only the effects test to determine if jurisdic-
tion exists, and using the comity factors only with regard to 
whether jurisdiction should be exercised, the court provided a 
much different standard than in Timberlane. 3'1 
36. ld. at 1297-98 (footnotes omitted). 
37. See the concurring opinion of Judge Adams in Mannington Mills, id. at 1299. 
This difference has been underscored in a recent case: 
Accordingly, the proper standard is a balancing test that 
weighs the impact of the foreign conduct on United States 
commerce against the potential international repercussions of 
asserting jurisdiction. In some cases, this analysis has been 
used to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in 
the first instance. See Mannington Mills, supra, at 1299-1300 
(Adams, J., concurring); Timberlane, supra, at 613. In others, 
the courts have first used the effects test alone to decide if 
jurisdiction is proper and then applied the foreign relations 
impact factors to determine if abstention would nevertheless 
be appropriate. See Mannington Mills, supra at 1294-1298 
(majority opinion). 
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687-88 
9
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Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Rio Algom Limited38 
The lengthy Westinghouse uranium litigation provided the 
next subject matter determination in foreign antitrust.39 In 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Rio Algom Limited, 
Westinghouse claimed that it was forced to default on numerous 
contracts because the sharp increase in the price of uranium ren-
dered performance financially impractical. Westinghouse had al-
leged that a cartel among United States and foreign entities to 
restrain uranium trade was the proximate cause of the price in-
crease. The threshold issue for the Westinghouse court was to 
determine its legislative authority over nine defaulting foreign 
corporations in view of the emerging trend toward international 
comity.40 
Westinghouse argued that the forum possessed jurisdiction 
over the controversy on the basis of the effects doctrine.41 It al-
leged that price-fixing agreements were entered into by the de-
fendants at locations in the United States and abroad, and that 
. the parties intended to affect United States commerce. The de-
faulters maintained that the comity factors must be considered 
either initially to determine if jurisdiction exists or subsequently 
to determine if jurisdiction should be exercised.42 
As in Mannington Mills, the court explicitly viewed the ju-
risdiction issue as a two-step process: "(1) [D]oes subject matter 
jurisdiction exist; and (2) if so, should it be exercised?"43 The 
Alcoa effects test was deemed sufficient to satisfy the first con-
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). For further discussions on Mannington Mills, see Comment, Defense to 
Actions Against Foreign States Under the United States Antitrust Laws, 20 HARV. 
INT'L L.J. 583 (1979); Note, A Further Step Toward a Complete Subject Matter Juris-
diction Test, 2 Nw. J. lNT'L L: & Bus. 241 (1980). 
38. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). 
39. For background on the litigation, see Comment, The International Uranium 
Cartel: Litigation and Legal Implications, 14 TEx. lNT'L L.J. 64 (1979). See, e.g., In re 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1977] 3 All E.R. 703, [1977] 
3 W.L.R. 430; Rio Tinto-Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 
434, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, involving the British Court's denial of discovery attempts by 
Westinghouse. 
40. 617 F.2d at 1253. Four Australian companies, two British companies, two South 
African companies and one Canadian corporation were in default. Id. at 1253 n.ll. 
41. Id. at 1253-56. 
42. Id. at 1254. 
43. Id. at 1253. 
10
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sideration, and proper jurisdiction was found;'" The court re-
sponded to the defaulters' argument by interpreting Timberlane 
to be consistent with the notion that jurisdiction still rests solely 
on the basis of the effects test. 
In deciding whether jurisdiction over the foreign corpora-
tions should be exercised, the court held the comity factors of 
Timberlane and Mannington Mills to be inapplicable. The court 
stated that the factors set out in Mannington -Mills were not 
binding because Mannington Mills was not the law of the Fifth 
Circuit."5 Then,' in dictum, the court stated that the defendants' 
absence from the court prevented a useful and beneficial inquiry 
into those factors."6 The important comity factors for t~e dis-
trict court were the complexity of the lawsuit, the seriousness of 
the charges, and the recalcitrant attitude of the defaulters."'1 
This approach was adopted by the appellate COurt."8 
Although the opinion strongly asserts its consistency with 
Timberlane, "9 the failure to consider the foreign nation interest 
makes that argument difficult to accept. Because Westinghouse 
only pleaded an intent to affect and an actual impact on United 
States commerce, the decision resurrects the effects test as the 
dominant factor for subject matter jurisdiction.50 
44. "Accordingly, the picture which emerges is one of concerted conduct both 
abroad and within the United States intended to affect the uranium market in this coun-
try •.•. We therefore conclude that Westinghouse's allegations against the defaulters do 
fall within the jurisdictional ambit of the Sherman Act, as defined in Alcoa." [d. at 1254. 
45. [d. at 1255. 
46. [d. at 1255-56. 
47. [d. at 1255. 
48. [d. at 1256. 
49. Amicus curiae stated that the Timberlane case required that jurisdiction be pre-
mised on a balancing test. The court responded: 
We do not read Timberlane so broadly. The "jurisdictional 
rule of reason" espoused in Timberlane is that while an effect 
on American commerce is the necessary ingredient for extra-
territorial jurisdiction, considerations of comity and fairness 
require a further determination as to "whether American au-
thority should be asserted in a given case." The clear thrust of 
the Timberlane Court is that once a district judge has deter-
mined that he has jurisdiction, he should consider additional 
factors to determine whether the exercise of that jurisdiction 
is appropriate. 
[d. at 1255 (footnotes omitted). 
50. The decision may not amount to a complete resurrection of the Alcoa test be-
cause in addition to the effect on commerce, it was alleged that part of the conspiracy 
• 
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Zenith Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Company51 
Zenith involved an alleged conspiracy among eight foreign 
and two domestic corporations to gain control of the American 
market for consumer electronic products.52 The plaintiffs, Zenith 
Radio Corporation (Zenith) and National Union Electric Corpo-
ration (NUE), and all the defendants, are world-wide manufac-
turers of conSlUIler electronic products. Zenith and NUE con-
tended that for a period of thirty years the defendants agreed to 
artificially lower the export prices of their products, including 
those in United States commerce. This was accomplished by 
flooding the United States markets with extremely low priced 
products. The plaintiffs alleged that this scheme was intended to 
eliminate the plaintiffs from competing effectively in the United 
States. As a result, NUE ceased production in the television re-
ceiver industry and Zenith was forced to relocate its operations 
outside the United States.58 
The subject matter jurisdiction issue involved Mitsubishi 
Electric Corporation, (MELCO), a Japanese corporation that 
neither sold products in the United States nor maintained a bus-
iness presence there. MELCO argued that this absence of a 
nexus to American foreign or domestic commerce required that 
it be dismissed from the action. MELCO asserted that the hold-
ing in American Banana was the controlling test for subject 
matter jurisdiction.54 While MELCO recognized Alcoa and its 
progeny, it attempted to distinguish those cases. 55 Additionally, 
MELCO contended that customary international law has never 
authorized the extraterritorial application of economic regula-
was entered into in the U.S. See note 16 supra. 
51. [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 63,288, 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
52. The principal defendants were: Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Toshiba 
Corporation, Hitachi, Ltd., Sharp Corporation, Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd., Sony Corpora-
tion, a Japanese trading company (Mitsubishi Corporation), and two American compa-
nies (Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Motorola, Inc.). "Fourteen other defendants are subsidi-
aries of these principals." 494 F. Supp. at 1164-65. 
53. ld. at 1165. For the litigation on other issues in the case, see Zenith Radio Corp. 
v. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co.; 494 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980); 494 F. Supp. 1246 
(E.D. Pa. 1980); National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 
1257 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 
1263 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
54. 494 F. Supp. at 1170. 
55.ld. 
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tory laws, especially when the conduct is legal in the country of 
its occurrence. liS The plaintiffs argued that the court did have 
subject matter jurisdiction over MELeo because it was alleged 
that MELeO participated in a world-wide conspiracy intended 
to affect and actually affecting American commerce.1S7 
The district court began by addressing MELeO's somewhat 
novel argument that customary international law operates as a 
bar to the extraterritorial application of economic laws. By -~efi­
nition, a principle of customary international law develops when 
nations regularly and repeatedly act in a certain manner because 
of an understanding that a legal obligation requires them to do 
so. liS Rather than analyze the development of customary law be-
tween nations in the economic area, the court instead focused on 
the relationship between customary international law and 
United States domestic law when the two conflict. The unequiv-
ocal position of the United States courts has been that "interna-
tionallaw must give way when it conflicts with or is superseded 
by a federal statute."119 Therefore, the determination is con-
trolled by United States law. 
According to MELeO, the controlling United States law 
was the strict territorial principle set forth in American Ba-
nana.60 The court rejected this argument, finding that "it is 
abundantly plain that some extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Act is proper. "Sl 
After noting the differing approaches by Mannington Mills 
and Timberlane, the court, in essence, failed to adopt either. 
The court chose not to rely entirely on Mannington Mills be-
cause "the parties in that case were both American firms, and 
the issues were therefore simpler .... "62 Instead, the following 
test was set forth: 
Our independent canvass convinces us that the 
Alcoa plus comity test applied in Mannington 
56. [d. at 1171. 
57. [d. 
58. See G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 1, at 26; J. BRIERLY, supra note 1, at 59-
62. 
59. 494 F. Supp. at 1178. 
60. See note 14 supra. 
61. 494 F. Supp. at 1185. 
-, 
62. [d. at 1189. 
13
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Mills is equally appropriate for the case at bar. 
Therefore, when we examine the factual record in 
this case, we will look for 1) intent to affect 
United States commerce, 2) some actual effect on 
that commerce; and 3) facts relevant to balancing 
the ten comity factors outlined in Mannington 
Mills . ... 68 
Contrary to Mannington Mills, the court specifically indicated 
that the "substantiality of both the effect and the intent are 
taken into consideration in the balancing process."s, This lan-
guage, added in a footnote, tends to revert the standard back 
toward a Timberlane framework by directly comparing the 
United States interests to the interests of the foreign nation. 
However, the court was not clear on this point. The court con-
cluded by deferring its final subject matter determination until 
completing a further factual analysis.811 
C. IMPACT 
Extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws is deemed 
necessary to prevent dissimilar regulation between businesses lo-
cated within and those located beyond the United States. It is 
believed that failure to regulate foreign conduct having an effect 
on United States foreign or interstate commerce would provide a 
haven for antitrust immunity. Conversely, the foreign nation in-
terest in the extraterritorial controversy lies in the infringement 
of national sovereignty. The significance of the Timberlane case 
is that these two competing national interests were weighed 
against each other to determine jurisdiction.8s In other words, 
the antitrust laws would apply to foreign conduct only when the' 
United States, on balance, is the most interested nation state. 
Certainly, the degree to which the conduct affects the com-
merce of the respective nations is of significance to both nations. 
The Timberlane court clearly states that the relative effects on 
63. ld. (footnotes omitted). 
64. I d. at 1189 n.66. 
65. ld. at 1189. 
66. In the litigation before the Timberlane opinion was decided, the only case that 
was reversed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was American Banana v. United 
Fruit, 213 U.S. 347 (1909). This includes actions brought both by the government and by 
private parties. See Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of American Antitrust Laws, 
43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 521 (1973-1974); W. FuGATE, supra note 4, at 498. 
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commerce should be compared, along with the other comity fac-
tors. Only in such a comparative context can the infringement of 
national sovereignty and the threat to effective antitrust en-
forcement be articulated. The developments since the balancing 
approach in Timberlane have resulted in courts placing greater 
emphasis on the interests of the United States, and giving corre-
spondingly less consideration to the legitimate foreign nation 
interests. 
The likelihood of dismissal of an antitrust suit is much 
greater under the Timberlane approach, because a moderate or 
even minimal foreign nation interest would warrant dismissal if 
the corresponding United States interest is of lesser significance. 
Under the Mannington Mills view, if application of the comity 
factors reveals a minimal or moderate foreign nation interest, 
this would presumably be insufficient to dismiss, in light of the 
existing United States subject matter jurisdiction over the con-
duct via the effects test. Only a strong foreign nation interest 
will suffice for dismissal under this test. 
While the Zenith case is a sign of encouragement for a more 
equitable treatment of the foreign nation interest, it is not cer-
tain that this approach will be employed in the future. This is-
sue is critical, especially to foreign entities, because after juris-
diction has been properly pleaded, the defending party becomes 
subject to the United States procedural rules for discovery.67 
When potential evidence is located abroad, the extraterritorial 
effect of a discovery order has also been a very sensitive issue 
among foreign nations.68 The United States has only partially 
responded to these concerns, as some extraterritorial discovery 
orders are upheld even if compliance violates a foreign law.69 
67. FED. R. ClY. P. 26-37 govern the discovery of parties. Failure to comply with a 
discovery order may attract" the sanctions of rule 37. 
68. In the past, foreign countries have responded with legislation which prohibits 
production of documents requested when the documents are located in their respective 
countries. See Quebec Business Concerns Act, Que. Rev. Stat. ch. 278 (1964); Nether-
lands Economic Competition Act of June 28, 1956, amended Act of July 16, 1958; (For-
eign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act), 1976, Australia. For the United 
Kingdom, see text accompanying notes 73-119 infra. 
69. The present standard of the United States is to weigh the hardships placed on 
the defendant in relationship to the importance of the documents to the plaintiff. The 
balance almost always favors the plaintiff because of the vital national interest in prose-
cuting antitrust violations. See Timberlane v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings 
.ASsoc., 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th 
15
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The subject matter jurisdiction issue is also important be-
cause the remedies enforced are guided by United States law. In 
general, antitrust violations are remedied by actual damages for 
suits brought by the United States government,'10 and by treble 
damages for suits brought by private parties.'1l The punitive na-
ture of the latter is rapidly becoming another area of interna-
tional disapproval. '12 
III. RETALIATORY LEGISLATION BY THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Recently, the United Kingdom (the legislating country) ap-
proved legislation that will create a disincentive to the extrater-
ritorial reach of various foreign laws.'18 The Protection of Trad-
ing Interests Act (the Act), contains four major components: 
[1] The Secretary of State is empowered to 
order non-compliance with commercial docu-
ment and information orders by foreign 
courts or authorities against persons in the 
United Kingdom, when the material sought 
is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
ordering country.'1· 
Cir. 1976); United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902-04 (2d Cir. 
1968); American Indus. Contracting, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 880 
(W.D. Pa. 1971). 
The prohibition under the law of the country where the documents are located is no 
excuse for failure to comply, although a good faith attempt to comply may induce the 
court to avoid using penalties. See generally E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, supra note 7, at 
48-58. However, collusion between the party and the foreign government will warrant 
either a production order or sanctions. See Note, Discovery of Documents Located 
Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the 
Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747 (1974). 
70. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976). 
71. Id. § 15. 
72. [May 8, 1980] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 963, A-10. Forty-one 
British Commonwealth Nations adopted a resolution against U.S. multiple damage en-
forcement. See, e.g., Australia's Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforce-
ment) Act, No. 13, AustI. Act (1979), and the United Kingdom's Protection of Trading 
Interests Act, 1980, c. 11. 
73. The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, [hereinafter cited as The 
Act], reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 959 at F-1. See Comment, 
United Kingdom Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 461 
(1980). 
74. The Act, c. 11 § 2. The Secretary of State is granted very broad discretion to 
disallow a request that "infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is otherwis~ 
prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom [or that] would be prejudicial to 
. the security of the United Kingdom or to the relations of the government of the United 
16
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[2] Foreign multiple. damage judgments are 
barred from recognition in the United King-
dom, and the Secretary of State possesses 
broad discretionary power to deny recogni-
tion to other foreign country judgments. '115 
[3] Certain parties suffering multiple dam-
age judgments in foreign courts are now pro-
vided with a cause of action which allows for 
a reduction of the award to actual damages.'16 
[4] The Act allows for recognition, in the 
legislating country, of judgments obtained in 
foreign tribunals from legal proceedings pur-
suant to a similar law. '1'1 
Kingdom with the government of any other country." ld. § 2(2). 
593 
Additionally, requests for commercial documents and information may also be de-
nied if made before a lawsuit has been filed in the foreign country. The Act § 2(3)(a). 
Similarly treated are orders requiring "a person to state what documents relevant to any 
such proceedings are or have been in his possession, custody or power or to produce. • • 
any documents other than particular documents specified in the requirement." The Act, 
§ 2(3)(b). This subsection will impede efforts by foreign countries in determining if a 
substantive offense has occurred. See Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 
1975, c. 34, superseded in part by The Act, § 4. 
75. Foreign judgments recognition by either statutory registration or common law 
proceedings no longer apply. "[A] judgment for multiple damages means a judgment for 
an amount arrived at by doubling, trebling or otherwise multiplying a sum assessed as 
compensation for the loss or damage sustained by the person in whose favor the judg-
ment is given." The Act, §§ 5(2)(a), 5(3). Multiple damage judgments rendered but not 
registered before March 20, 1980, are also affected. See The Act, § 5(6). 
Foreign judgments for actual damages are also affected: 
The Secretary of State may make an order in respect of any 
provision or rule of law which appears to him to be concerned 
with the prohibition or regulation of agreements, arrange-
ments or practices designed to restrain, distort or restrict com-
petition in the carrying on of business of any description or to 
be otherwise concerned with the promotion of such competi-
tion as aforesaid. 
The Act, § 5(4). See text accompanying notes 79-89 infra. 
76. The Act, § 6. See text accompanying notes 90-116 infra. 
77. If it appears to Her Majesty that the law of an overseas coun-
try provides or will provide for the enforcement in that coun-
try of judgments given under section 6 above, Her Majesty 
may by Order in Council provide for the enforcement in the 
United Kingdom of judgments given under any provision of 
the law of that country corresponding to that section. An Or-
der under this section may apply, with or without modifica-
tion, any of the provisions of the Foreign Judgments (Recipro-
cal Enforcement) Act 1933. 
The Act, § 7. 
17
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The remainder of this Comment will focus primarily on the 
"non-recognition of judgments" and the "cause of action" 
claUses of the Act as they relate to United States antitrust 
enforcement.78 
A. RESTRICTIONS ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF CERTAIN OVERSEAS 
JUDGMENTS 
The section of the Act providing for the non-recognition of 
certain overseas judgments alters the procedures for enforce-
ment of various foreign country judgments in the United King-
dom. Briefly stated, statutory registration and common law pro-
ceedings are prohibited methods for enforcing foreign country 
judgments that either are in excess of actual damages or were 
rendered pursuant to laws promoting a competitive economic 
system.79 This controversial section mandates non-recognition of 
all foreign judgments for multiple damages, and provides the 
Secretary of State with the option to not recognize other foreign 
judgments that were rendered pursuant to the economic regula-
tory laws of a foreign nation. so 
The unequivocal language with regard to multiple damage 
judgments characterizes such awards as per se contrary to Brit-
ish public policy.81 The critical factor is that the Act addresses 
multiple damage judgments rather than just the multiple dam-
ages; even the compensatory amount of a foreign multiple dam-
age judgment will not be recognized by a United Kingdom 
court.S2 The legislative intent is to discourage foreign lawsuits 
78. Other provisions of the Act include: (1) an enabling section that grants the Sec-
retary of State sole authority to decide the impact of conduct by an overseas country on 
international trade, and if determined to be damaging to British trading interests, the 
Secretary can order notification and noncompliance by persons in the United Kingdom 
that are adversely affected. The Act, § 1; (2) criminal penalties against citizens of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies or body corporates incorporated therein for acts done in 
the territorial boundaries of the United Kingdom that contravene the orders or direc-
tions of the Secretary of State. The Act, § 3; (3) the repealing of (a) the Shipping Con-
tracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, c. 87, and (b) paragraph 18 of Schedule 2 
and paragraph 24 of Schedule 3 of the Criminal Law Act, 1977, c. 45. The Act, § 8(5). 
79. See note 75 supra. 
80. Id. 
81. Administration of Justice Act 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5 c. 81, § 9(2)(f); Foreign Judg-
ments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5 c. 13, § 4(I)(a)(v), § 8(1), (2). 
82. The Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil Matters, initialed Oct. 26, 1976, United States - United Kingdom, reprinted in 
16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 71 (1977), was the result of a bilateral attempt to provide a 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss2/4
1981] FOREIGN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 595 
against individuals, corporations, and subsidiaries that have as-
sets in the United Kingdom.s3 
Since all multiple damages are denied, this section can be 
broadly applied. For example, multiple damage judgments are 
not recognized even though the defendant in the foreign litiga-
tion submitted to the court's jurisdiction.s4 Similarly, if the de-
fendants satisfy the strict territoriality concept of subject matter 
jurisdiction in the rendering country, the judgment is still not 
enforceable in the United Kingdom. Multiple damage judgments 
against individuals of any nationality, or corporations registered 
under the laws of any country, can prevent a successful party 
from recovering assets that are located within the territory of 
the United Kingdom in satisfaction of the multiple damage 
judgment.slI Perhaps most drastically, citizens and corporations 
uniform approach to the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil cases, includ-
ing violations of economic laws. Although the Convention was never ratified, certain pro-
visions of the text are useful in articulating the scope of this section of the Act. The 
Convention expressly excluded recognition of judgments "to the extent that they are for 
punitive or multiple damages." ld. Art. 2(2)(b). However, on the issue of whether or not 
the compensatory amount of such judgments should be recognized, the Convention 
stated: "Severable parts of a judgment in respect of different matters shall be entitled to 
recognition or enforcement under this Convention if such parts would have been so enti-
tled had they taken the form of separate judgments." ld. Art. 2(5). A broad reading of 
this section indicates that the compensatory part of a treble damages antitrust award 
would be recognized because it is severable and easily calculable. See Hay & Walker, The 
Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments Convention Between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, 11 TEx. lNT'L L.J. 421, 423 (1976). The qualifying language in section 5 
of Article 2 of the Convention is not included in section 5 of the Act. For further discus-
sions on the United States-United Kingdom Convention, see Smit, The Proposed United 
States-United Kingdom Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A 
Prototype for the Future?, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 443 (1976-1977); Hay & Walker, The Pro-
posed U.S.-U.K. Recognition-of-Judgments Convention: Another Perspective, 18 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 753 (1977-1978). 0 
83. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533 (1979). 
84. This directly conflicts with United Kingdom statutory and common law because 
judgments are generally recognized and enforced when the defendant has voluntarily ap-
peared in the foreign tribunal. See Administrative Justice Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 
81, §§ 9(2)(a), (b) and Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933, 24 & 25 
Geo. 5, c. 13, § 4(2)(a)(i). See also Smith, Personal Jurisdiction, 2 INT'L AND COMPo L.Q. 
510 (1953). 
The policy collision has been averted in the Westinghouse litigation because the 
British corporate defendants declined to appear, and instead submitted amicus curiae 
briefs. A similar response can be expected in future multiple damages cases. See text 
accompanying notes 38-50 supra. 
85. Additionally, in Pziser, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, reh. denied, 
435 U.S. 910 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a foreign government was a "person" 
within the meaning of § 4 of the Sherman Act, and was thus entitled to sue for treble 
damages. The Court emphasized that foreign plaintiffs must be afforded the opportunity 
19
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are insulated from 'a multiple damage judgment rendered against 
them by their own country if assets sought for execution of the 
judgment are located in the United Kingdom. This holds true 
even though the issue involved may not concern British trading 
interests or may even promote economic policies similar to the 
United Kingdom.88 The ability of a private party to enforce 
American antitrust laws is certain to be curtailed as a result of 
this multiple dama~e section. 
Because of the Secretary of State's power to order non-rec-
ognition of actual damage judgments, the scope of this section is 
not clearly delineated. This portion of the Act allows an order to 
be made if the substantive law applied in the foreign tribunal 
either discourages cooperative business behavior or encourages 
competitive behavior.87 The legislative focus in this instance is 
to enforce the antitrust laws. 
Also, § 4 of the Clayton Act allows reasonable attorney fees to successful antitrust 
plaintiffs. This additional amount appears to satisfy the Act's definition of multiple 
damages. 
, 86. Compare Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, No. 
13, Austl. Act (1979). This law enacted by the Australian government has a limited" 
scope, thereby presenting a far more sensible approach. 
First, the Australian Act focuses on only antitrust judgments rendered by a foreign 
court which had asserted jurisdiction inconsistent with Australian standards, or which 
had in some manner threatened the trading stature of Australian commerce. Second, the 
Attorney-General maintains absolute .discretion to grant total or partial enforcement or 
deny enforcement. 
The problems with the British law are eliminated. Under the Australian statute, 
recognition depends on jurisdiction rather than the punitive nature of the judgment. 
Also, actual damages of a multiple damage judgment can be recovered if the Attorney-
General finds jurisdiction to have been proper in the foreign court. The key factor is that 
the Attorney-General maintains some discretion. 
For an overview of Australian antitrust law, see Taylor, The Extraterritoriality of 
the Australian Antitrust Law, 13 J. lNT'L L. ECON. 273 (1979). 
87. The economic policies of th~ United"Kingdom are not guided by the notion that 
all anticompetitive behavior is per se harmful to the economy. Five statutes comprise the 
restrictive trade laws of the United Kingdom: Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (In-
quiry and Control) Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 c. 66; Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956, 
4 & 5 Eliz. 2 c. 68; Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1968, c. 66; Fair Trading Act, 1973, c. 
41; Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1976, c. 34. In general, all restrictive agreements 
between two or more persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom must be regis-
tered with the government, provided the agreements are for goods or services. See Re-
strictive Trade Practices Act, 1976, c. 34 §§ 6, 11. Certain anticompetitive agreements 
are permitted if one of the following conditions is present: the agreement is important to 
the national economy, it holds down prices, or it generates some other public benefit. 
Determinations are made by the Restrictive Practices Court. 
Thus, a conflict arises when the business entities making the agreement comply with 
United Kingdom antitrust law, but are condemned by the United States because their' 
cooperative behavior has had an anticompetitive effect on American foreign commerce. 
20
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on countries with economic laws that are substantially different 
from those of the United Kingdom. It addresses itself to actual 
damage judgments which directly relate to antitrust suits prose-
cuted by the United States gov~rnment.88 
The extent to which the Secretary of State will utilize his 
discretion is subject to great specualtion. Undoubtedly, this 
clause would be utilized when the foreign country has over-
stepped the principle of subjective territorial jurisdiction and 
employed an objective territorial jurisdiction test.89 In antitrust 
suits prosecuted by the United States government, the risk of 
non-recognition is very high when the defendants are citizens or 
corporations of the United Kingdom and lack a subjective terri-
toriallink to the United States. It is quite possible that the Sec-
retary would order non-recognition regardless of the nationality 
of the defendants as long as the territorial link was not present. 
B. THE NEW CAUSE OF ACTION ALLOWING RECOUPMENT FOR 
CERTAIN AGGRIEVED PARTIES 
The new cause of action, allowing recoupment of the 
amount above actual damages awarded, imposes two qualifica-
tions on a party attempting to invoke its provisions (the qualify-
ing defendant). First, the qualifying defendant must bear a suffi-
cient territorial relationship with the legislating country such 
that the United Kingdom has an interest in protecting that per-
son or entity, and second, the qualifying defendant must be ade-
quately disconnected from the forum which rendered the multi-
ple damage judgment.9o 
The Relationship Between The Qualifying Defendant and The 
Legislating Country 
The recoupment section allows a party to recover if it is a 
citizen, corporation, or person carrying on business in the legis-
88. Presumably, the per se denial is not applied in this instance for two reasons: 1) 
the U.S. government, not being a private party, will be involved and thus other consider-
ations may be present, and 2) if jurisdiction is consistent with the strict territoriality 
principle, recognition may be granted. 
89. The first test will most likely be the Westinghouse case where Rio Tinto Zinc 
Corp., Ltd., and RTZ Services, Ltd., were subjected to the United States antitrust laws 
by application of the objective territorial principle. See text accompanying notes 38-50 
supra. 
90. The Act, § 6(1). 
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lating country.91 A citizen and a body corporate have been 
clearly defined by statute and the composition of these groups is 
easily ascertainable.92 However, the same is not true for a person 
carrying on business in the United Kingdom. 
In the United Kingdom, the issue of what constitutes "car-
rying on business" has developed from common law. There are 
four requirements which must be met before a company or other 
business arrangement is deemed to carry on business: 
[1] The activity must in fact be operated as a business.93 
[2] The business must be located at a fixed and perma-
nent place within the territorial jurisdiction of the leg-
islating country.94 
[3] The business must have been in operation for a sub-
stantial period of time.915 
[4] In the case of an entity formed or incorporated abroad, 
the agent or subsidiary in the legislating country must 
possess independent authority to act.96 
91. Id. 
92. An individual is a citizen of the United Kingdom by birth therein, descent, natu-
ralization, or any statutory decree. See 4 HALsBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1111 905, 908 (4th 
ed.). Aliens can obtain citizenship, subject to the major qualification of eight years resi-
dency. See id. 11 916. Additionally, individuals of the United Kingdom Colonies also 
qualify as citizens of the United Kingdom. See id. 1111 902-03. The controlling statute in 
this area is the British Nationality Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 c. 56, amended 1965 c. 34. 
The requirements for corporate creation are outlined in 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENG-
LAND, 1111 1231-1248 (4th ed.). A corporation incorporated under English law has British 
nationality irrespective of the nationality of its members. Id. 11 1227. 
93. A business entails every trade, occupation, or profession, and also includes banks 
and other intangibles. See generally A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 164 
(9th ed. 1973). 
94. Id. A fixed and permanent place has been interpreted to require a person to 
conduct actual business operations at a defined location within the jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, a place of business in the form of an office easily suffices. In re Tea Trading K 
and C. Popoff Bros. [1933] Ch. 647. A temporary sales stand has also satisfied the stan-
dard. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co., Ltd. v. Actien-Gesellschaft FUr Motor [1902] 1 KB. 
342. 
95. See A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 93. Nine days of operation has been held 
to be sufficient. There is no indication that any lesser amount of time would be insub-
stantial. However, the business must be in actual operation rather than preparing to 
operate or winding up. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co., Ltd. v. Actien-Gesellschaft FUr Mo-
tor [1902] 1 KB. 342. 
96. The business must be that of the corporation, not that of the 
agent who acts for it in England. This condition is fulfilled if 
the agent has authority to make contracts on behalf of the cor-
poration, even if he is paid only by commission, pays the rent 
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The requirements of the "carrying on business" standard 
are consistent with the subjective territorial principle of jurisdic-
tion followed by the United Kingdom.97 Having been found to 
have carried on business there, foreign entities are regularly sub-
jected to suit in the United Kingdom.98 Thus, certain foreign en-
tities are intended to be included among the beneficiaries of the 
cause of action for recoupment. 
The Relationship Between The Qualifying Defendant and The 
Rendering Country 
Even if an aggrieved party is properly before the British 
court, recoupment is not automatically guaranteed. Recoupment 
depends on the relationship between the qualifying defendant 
and the foreign court that rendered the multiple damage award. 
Recoupment will be denied when the <;lefendant's nexus to the 
adjudicating forum is one of ordinary residence, or corporate 
identity and principal place of business, or carrying on business 
there in an activity exclusive to that country.99 
An individual obtains the status of ordinary residence when 
physically present in the forum with the intent to remain there 
indefinitely.loo This standard requires a greater nexus than just 
a temporary or passing presence.lOl As long as the defendant is 
of his office, and also acts as agent for another foreign corpora-
tion. But it is not fulfilled if the agent has no general author-
ity to make contracts on behalf of the corporation but merely 
to obtain orders and 8ubmit them to the foreign corporation 
for approval. 
A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 93, at 164 (footnotes omitted). 
97. See International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Third Conference, 185 
(Buenos Aires, 1968). 
98. English courts recognise as juristic persons corporations estab-
lished by foreign law in virtue of the fact of their creation and 
continuance under and by that law. However, an entity which, 
according to its proper law, possesses in certain respects a sep-
arate persona may not for this purpose necessarily, be re-
garded as a corporation. Companies incorporated outside 
Great Britain which have established a place of business 
. within Great Britain are subject in certain respects to statu-
tory control. 
9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 11 1229 (4th ed.) (footnotes omitted) (citing Companies 
Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 c. 38 §§ 406,407,409-416). 
99. The Act, §§ 5(3), (4). 
100. See 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1111 444-45 (4th ed.). 
101. [d. 
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situated in the rendering country with the present intent to re-
main there and has disconnected ties with a previous country of 
residence, the recoupment provision cannot be invoked. 
When the qualifying defendant is a corporation, the ability 
of the defendant to bring a successful action for recoupment de-
pends upon the location of the defendant's principal place of 
business. If it is situated in the rendering country, the defendant 
fails to qualify for recoupment. The principal place of business 
has been interpreted to be the place where the business is cen-
trally managed and controlled.102 This indicates a place where 
administrative and operational decisions are made. 
In addition to the limitations imposed on individuals and 
corporations, recoupment is denied to any personl08 carrying on 
business in the rendering country if the activity is exclusive to 
that-country. Since the same requirements for establishing "car-
rying on business" discussed earlier are applicable here, there 
must be a presently existing business operation located at a 
fixed place for a substantial period of time within the foreign 
jurisdiction. 1M However, the scope of this section is drastically 
limited because it only applies when the proceedings in which 
the multiple damage judgment was rendered were not concerned 
with activities "exclusively carried on in that country." The pre-
cise meaning of what constitutes an exclusive activity is not de-
fined by British statutory or common law, so that the actual im-
pact of this clause cannot be predicted accurately. However, in 
relation to jurisdiction of the Sherman Act and its progeny on 
United States foreign trade and commerce, foreign antitrust 
suits may never be barred from recoupment because foreign 
trade and commerce are not likely to be considered exclusive ac-
tivities. Therefore, the reach of the new cause of action will 
likely extend to those who suffer a multiple damage judgment 
from a country in which they carryon business, as long as busi-
102. See A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 93, at 703. 
103. The word "person" in a public statute as a general rule includes a person in 
law, that is, a corporation, as well as a natural person, and, in every Act of Parliament 
passed on or after 1st January 1890, the expression person, unless, the contrary intention 
appears, includes any body of persons corporate or unincorporate. See The Interpreta-
tion Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63 §§ 19, 42. Therefore, foreign corporations as well as 
other business arrangements can come within the limitation because a contrary intention 
does not appear. 
104. See text accompanying notes 93-96 supra. 
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ness is carried on simultaneously in the United Kingdom. 
Lack. Of Jurisdictional Requirements Over the Winning Party 
In The Multiple Damage Litigation 
The limitations placed on qualifying defendants for recoup-
ment purposes, are not similarly imposed on the actual defen-
dants in this subsequent litigation-the -winning party in the 
first action. Although proper jurisdiction over an adverse party 
has been critical to the maintenance of an action in a British 
COurt,105 the new statute dispenses with that traditional element: 
"A court in the United KingdoPl may entertain proceedings on a 
claim under this section notwithstanding that the person against 
whom the proceedings are brought is not within the jurisdiction 
of the court."IOS Thus, this section gives a United Kingdom court 
power to render judgment against parties that are not subject to 
the court's personal jurisdiction. The winning party is adversely 
affected by this even if no assets are located in the United King-
dom and the party has no connections with that forum,107 be-
cause the qualifying defendant can still obtain a default judg-
ment and seek satisfaction elsewhere. 
Scope of the Action for Recoupment 
The action for recoupment encompasses a range of potential 
qualifying defendants beyond British citizens and corpora-
tions.IOS While an action for recoupment deters the private party 
105. "A foreign corporation is resident in this country for purposes of suit if it is 
conducting its own business at some fixed place within the jurisdiction." 9 HALSBURY'S 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 11 1385 (4th ed.). For individuals, the defendant must be present in 
England and served there with a writ. For partnerships and other businesses, a la~suit 
can be maintained against them only if business is being carried on in England. See A. 
DICEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 93, at 159. 
106. The Act, § 6 (5). 
107. Of the five principles of jurisdiction, the two which justify prescribing such a 
rule of law are the passive personality and protective principles. Both have been rejected 
by the United Kingdom. See 18 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND 11 1531 (4th ed.). 
108. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
provides an example of the benefits of the action for recoupment to a British national. 
The two plaintiffs were whiskey distributors operating in the United States. The two 
defendants were corporations organized and existing under the laws of the United King-
dom. The parties had distributorship contracts whereby whiskey was sold f.o.b. United 
Kingdom ports to the exclusive United States distributors. The contracts included termi-
nation clauses of three months and sixty days respectively. When the defendants exer-
cised the termination clause, the plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy among defendants to im-
pose the short term clauses in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Wilson 
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in the antitrust area from prosecuting a violation when jurisdic-
tion is based only on the "effects test," the provisions clearly 
extend beyond these boundaries. The result is a dangerous 
threat to effective antitrust enforcement in the United States. 
The practical differences between the objective and subjec-
tive territorial principles are very narrow. Both concepts recog-
nize jurisdiction based on citizenship and incorporation wher-
ever the conduct occurS.I09 Further, the "carrying on business" 
standard is also an agreed upon basis for jurisdiction under ei-
ther view.110 The two theories only diverge in evaluating conduct 
by foreign entities occurring outside the rendering country.1l1 
Assuming an antitrust multiple damage judgment has been ren-
dered in an United States court, the British cause of action op-
erates against the objective territorial principle by partially com-
pensating those foreign entities with the requisite nexus to the 
United Kingdom.1l2 Because the "effects test" remains a proper 
standard for United States subject matter jurisdiction,118 the 
private party in an antitrust suit is certain to lose the punitive 
portion of an award when the effects test is relied upon for juris-
diction.11O( Thus, the initial suit will only be brought if the actual 
Tariff Act. The defense moved for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The 
court denied the motion because an intent to affect commerce and an actual effect 
therein were alleged. 
If a multiple damage judgment was rendered against the British corporations, the 
defendants would have a cause of action for recoupment. First, the nexus to the United 
Kingdom would be satisfied by their incorporation there. Second, the disconnection with 
the United States would be established because the principal place of business is abroad 
an~ the defe!ldant did not "carry .on business" in the United States. 
109. See, 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 321-27 (1980). 
110. "[T]here is no question that American courts may enforce American law under 
the territorial principle against foreign companies that carry on business in the United 
States." Id. at 324 (footnotes omitted). 
111. Id. But as Kintner accurately points out, the only case in this category is the 
Alcoa decision. 
112. Therefore, in a case like Alcoa, where some of the defendants were Swiss, 
French and British corporations, and American subsidiaries, the recoupment action 
would be available because the defendants did not carryon business in the United States 
and did not have their principal place of business there. However, in a situation like 
Timberlane, the recoupment clause could not be utilized because the defendant was a 
body corporate with its principal place of business in the United States. See text accom-
panying notes 24-27 supra. 
113. See Part II of this Comment, supra. 
114. Note that in the Westinghouse litigation, the United Kingdom defendants ellll-
ily qualify for recoupment. Furthermore, the other defendants could also qualify if they· 
"carryon business" in the United Kingdom. 
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damages can adequately compensate the private plaintiff. The 
unlikeliness of this occurring will make recoupment a useful 
weapon against the alleged extraterritorial reach of the United 
States antitrust laws.u15 
If the cause of action applied only to the type of multiple 
damage defendants described above, some degree of consistency 
with the present concept of territorial jurisdiction could be 
maintained.u6 However, the provisions are so broad that the 
cause of action is capable of applying in 'situations that are of 
minimal British concern. For example, by placing emphasis on 
the qualifying defendant's principal place of business rather 
than on the location of incorporation, the Act will cause the 
United States to lose the right·to fully legislate against its own 
incorporates, simply because they carryon business in England. 
Thus, an United States corporation subject to a treble damage 
judgment can qualify. Additionally, by emphasizing the ordinary 
residence of the qualifying defendant rather than citizenship, 
the right to fully enforce rules of law against citizens is re-
strained if they happen to be ordinary residents of the United 
Kingdom. Also, by requiring involvement in an "exclusive activ-
ity" before the qualifying defendant may be dismissed, the abil-
ity to fully legislate against those who carry on business in the 
United States is sacrificed for the British interest in protecting 
those who carry on business there. 
The recoupment action has no qualifications for the nature 
of the transaction out of which the multiple damage judgment 
arose. Legislating against lawsuits originating from international 
trade and commerce may be· understandable, but suits arising 
from purely domestic antitrust violations also present opportu-
nities for recoupment. In these situations, the recoupment sec-
tion does not appear to support any legitimate British interest. 
As the interest of any nation in international transactions fluctu-
ates depending on the facts and circumstances in each case, so 
too should the application of its laws. The recoupment section of 
115. The significant policy factors for the severity of the sanctions provided in the 
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act are to redress injury and to create an incentive to 
prosecute violations. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW 33-41,149-153,227-
29 (1978). 
116. See Report of the Fifty-First Conference, supra note 8, at 304-557; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 30 (1965). 
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the Act inadequately responds to this problem because it repre-
sents a fixed standard to be employed without consideration of 
United States interests. 
C. THE ATTEMPT To ENCOURAGE OTHER COUNTRIES To PASS A 
SIMILAR STATUTE 
When the plaintiff in the multiple damage action possesses 
assets in the United Kingdom, the recoupment process presents 
few, if any, problems for the qualifying defendant. The requisite 
procedure for obtaining a judgment in an amount above actual 
damages, and satisfaction by execution, are events that will oc-
cur entirely in the United Kingdom. A different situation arises 
when the plaintiff either does not hold assets in the United 
Kingdom or has removed them from that jurisdiction before ini-
tiating the multiple damage lawsuit in the forei$Il tribunal. The 
absence of assets to levy upon will limit the scope of the recoup-
ment section, even though the defendant is able to qualify under 
the provisions of the Act. . 
In this situation, the only option for a qualifying defendant 
is to obtain a judicial decree for recoupment from a United 
Kingdom court and proceed to seek recognition of this judgment 
in a country where the plaintiff's assets are located.ll7 The Act 
encourages this activity by appealing to a system of reciprocity. 
If a foreign country will recognize and enforce judgments ren-
dered under the recoupment section of the Act, then the United. 
Kingdom will reciprocate by recognizing judgments from the for-
eign country that stem from a similar statute.llS This will com-
pensate parties that cannot qualify in the territory where the 
assets are located by allowing qualification in one territory and 
judgment recognition in another. 
Thus, an action for recoupment may be maintained by Brit-
ish citizens and corporations, and by persons carrying on busi-
ness there even though the assets are located elsewhere. Simi-
larly, multiple damage defendants that are incapable of 
qualifying under the British statute could qualify under a simi-
lar statute elsewhere and then rely on the plaintiff's assets in the 
117. For the United Kingdom approach to foreign judgments, see A. DICEY & J. 
MORRIS, supra note 93, at 209-14. 
118. The Act, § 7; for the text of § 7, see note 77 supra. 
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United Kingdom for satisfaction. This forces the plaintiff in a 
treble damage antitrust lawsuit to locate its assets either in the 
United States, where recoupment would be impossible, or in a 
country where a similar law would likely not be passed. 
This particular section of the Act aims at achieving univer-
sal opposition to the extraterritorial application of United States 
antitrust laws. The success of this attempt is highly unpredict-
able at this early stage. Undoubtedly, the critical factors will be 
the manner in which United States laws are applied, the status 
of relations between the respective countries, and the attitude 
regarding the legality of extraterritorial application. Although 
similar legislation has not yet been enacted, many' foreign na-
tions have responded favorably.ue 
IV. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ACT 
AND THE EMERGING UNITED STATES TEST FOR 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
As the previous section indicates, the constraints on discov-
ery and judgment recognition and the opportunity for recoup-
ment significantly reduce the private enforcement of United 
States antitrust laws. The effect may be so adverse that a poten-
tial plaintiff will refrain from pursuing antitrust violations. Un-
fortunately, the Act has an additional element that is very dis-
concerting to public and private enforcement of United States 
antitrust laws.12o Although probably not the intent of the draft-
ers, the new Act operates to tip the scale of the emerging balanc-
ing test for subject matter jurisdiction in favor of a finding that 
the United States does not have subject matter jurisdiction in a 
particular case. 
Presuming that the ten Mannington Mills factors remain 
the standard by which United States courts pay tribute to inter-
national comity, the presence of the Act will be an important 
factor in the courts' determinations. For example, the new Act 
creates a clear conflict of law between the United States and the 
119. The forty-one Commonwealth nations and Australia have threatened to enact 
identical legislation for a cause of action if the treble damages are awarded in the West-
inghouse litigation. 
120. This discussion assumes that the effects test plus the ten Mannington Mills 
factors is the test for subject matter jurisdiction. 
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United Kingdom.121 This would lend support to the dismissal of 
cases. Similarly, the new Act undoubtedly establishes a conflict 
of policy between the two nations, a factor that also favors dis-
missal.122 Perhaps most importantly, the Act decreases the like-
lihood that an American court can make its order effective.123 
Failure of effective enforcement would arise when the plaintiff 
has assets in the United Kingdom or in another country with a 
similar statute because multiple damage judgments would no 
longer be recognized. 
The manner in which the Mannington Mills factors will be 
applied and the relative weight to be given to each has not yet 
been determined. Therefore, calculating the precise effect the 
Act will have on the Mannington Mills factors is difficult. It 
would be unwise for an American court to disregard interna-
tional comity entirely because of the offensive nature of the Act. 
However, complete deference in all cases where the Act could 
become a factor after judgment cannot be recommended. 
Rather, the United States courts should evaluate the Act in light 
of the Mannington Mills factors only in those cases where the 
power over the defendant requires application of the "effects 
test." When the subjective territorial principle can be employed 
to bring the suit before an United States tribunal, the Act 
should not be considered in the subject matter jurisdiction 
analysis. 
v. CONCLUSION 
When economic regulatory laws and policies conflict, resolu-
tion of legal matters has been an impossible task. The govern-
ments involved continue to view their respective approaches as 
being consistent with domestic laws as well as international 
principles. This has been the traditional position of the United 
121. The importance of giving closer consideration to the foreign interest when a 
conflict exists was recognized in Mannington Mills as one of the ten balancing factors. 
Se"e text accompanying note 36 supra. 
"A court evaluating these factors should identify the potential degree of conflict if 
American authority is asserted. A difference in law or policy is one likely sore spot," 
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614. In an adjoining footnote the court stated that dissimilar 
economic laws do not always indicate a conflict because non-prohibition does not always 
mean approval. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 127 (1974). 
122. This was also a factor highlighted by the Mannington Mills court. See text 
accompanying note 36 supra. 
123. See text accompanying note 36 supra. 
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States in defending the "effects test."l24 The United Kingdom 
has responded to criticisms of the Act in a similar fashion.125 
Bilateral approaches to this problem have met with very 
limited success and only then in the area of foreign judgment 
recognition.126 Negotiations between the United States and the 
United Kingdom have been occurring for nearly a decade.127 The 
aim has been to reach an agreement on recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments in civil matters. The controversy over 
the proper jurisdictional requirements to obtain recognition has 
prevented a final agreement.128 The Act appears to operate as a 
further obstacle to an agreement. 
A unilateral approach has been the most common measure. 
For example, the Antitrust Guide to International Operationsl29 
has brought a degree of certainty and predictability to the anti-
trust field. Additionally, in the past three years, the Antitrust 
Division has refrained from prosecuting possible antitrust viola-
tions by foreigners operating outside the United States. The Di-
vision has indicated that the interests of foreign nations will not 
be taken lightly.lsO Progress in the private sector has not been as 
significant. The balancing of interests standard developed in 
Timberlane and its progeny provides a more constructive ap-
proach than either interpretation of the territorial principle. 
While presently deficient in providing certain and predictable 
results, the balancing method has the potential for bringing 
American antitrust enforcement into a position of international 
124. See Shenefield, The Perspective of the U.S. Department of Justice, in AMERI-
CAN BAR AsSOCIATION, PERSPECTIVES ON ExTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTI-
TRUST AND OTHER LAWS 12-25 (J. Griffin ed. 1979). 
125. See Comment, The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 
461 (1980). 
126. The United States has negotiated successful agreements with Canada, re-
printed in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 50,112, and West Germany, reprinted in 5 TRADE 
REG. REP. (CCH) 11 50,283. 
127. See note 82 supra. 
128.Id. 
129. The Antitrust Guide to International Operations, published by the United 
States Justice Department in 1977, attempts to clarify the situations in which the U.S. 
antitrust laws will apply to foreign operations. See Fugate, The Department of Justice's 
Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 645 (1977); Griffin, A 
Critique of the Justice Department's Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 11 
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 215 (1978). 
130. See comments by Associate Attorney General, John H. Shenefield, in 5 TRADE 
REG. REP. (CCH) 11 50,424. 
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acceptance. 
The attempt to isolate the United States through retalia-
tory legislation will be strongly resisted. Although the Act does 
have its own extraterritorial effect in practice, it may only serve 
as a ,bargaining element in future government negotiations. 
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